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ABSTRACT: Using a representative establishment data set for Germany, we show 
that more than 40 percent of plants covered by collective agreements pay wages 
above the level stipulated in the agreement, which gives rise to a wage cushion 
between the levels of actual and contractual wages. Cross-sectional and fixed-
effects estimations for the period 2001-2006 indicate that the wage cushion mainly 
varies with the profit situation of the plant and with indicators of labour shortage and 
the business cycle. While plants bound by multi-employer sectoral agreements 
seem to pay wage premiums in order to overcome the restrictions imposed by the 
rather centralized system of collective bargaining in Germany, plants which make 
use of single-employer agreements are significantly less likely to have wage 
cushions. 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG:  Anhand von repräsentativen  Daten  des  IAB-Betriebs-
panels  zeigen wir, dass über 40 Prozent der tarifgebundenen Betriebe  in 
Deutschland höhere Löhne als im Tarifvertrag festgelegt zahlen, was zu einer 
Lohnspanne  (bzw. einem Lohnpuffer)  zwischen Effektiv-  und Tariflöhnen führt. 
Querschnitts-  und Fixe-Effekte-Schätzungen  für den Zeitraum 2001-2006 deuten 
darauf hin, dass die übertarifliche Entlohnung hauptsächlich mit der Ertragslage des 
Betriebes und mit Indikatoren der Arbeitskräfteknappheit und des Konjunkturzyklus 
variiert. Während an Flächentarifverträge gebundene Betriebe über Tarif entlohnen 
dürften, um Beschränkungen zu überwinden, die ihnen durch das relativ zentrali-
sierte Tarifverhandlungssystem in Deutschland auferlegt werden, weisen Betriebe 
mit Firmentarifverträgen wesentlich seltener eine übertarifliche Entlohnung auf. 
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In Germany, like in many other countries, employers usually complain that wages 
and labour costs are too high. At the same time, there is some evidence that quite a 
few employers in the private sector pay actual wages which are higher than the 
contractual wages negotiated in collective agreements. Unfortunately there are no 
official statistics on the existence and the size of this “wage cushion” (i.e. the 
difference between the levels of actual and contractual wages).
1 The last official 
survey on the levels of actual and contractual wages was conducted in 1962 (see 
Decken 1964), and the German Federal Statistical Office nowadays only provides 
indices of the development of actual and contractual wages.
2
The paper proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 sketches the institutional background of 
wage determination in Germany and gives some descriptive information on the 
existence and the size of the wage cushion. Theoretical considerations on the 
determinants of the wage cushion are provided in Chapter 3, while Chapter 4 
presents the results of our econometric analysis. Chapter 5 concludes. 
 In this paper, we use 
the IAB Establishment Panel, a representative annual survey of almost 16,000 
establishments in Germany, to overcome this information deficit and analyze the 
presence, the size and the determinants of the wage cushion in Germany. 
There are several reasons why such an analysis seems to be worthwhile. First, the 
presence of a wage cushion and the fraction of firms affected provide some 
information on the relative importance of (multi- or single-employer) collective wage 
bargaining by trade unions and employers associations on the one hand and of the 
determination of actual wages by individual firms on the other. Second, since a 
wage cushion reflects differences in actual wages between different firms, 
employees and regions (within the same bargaining unit), its size and development 
can also be interpreted as an indicator of wage differentiation and wage flexibility in 
the German system of wage determination, which is often regarded as rather rigid. 
Third, it will be interesting to see which factors influence the existence and the size 
of a wage cushion in individual establishments and whether these determinants are 
consistent with hypotheses derived from various theories of wage determination. 
                                            
1   The expression “wage cushion“, which seems to have been coined by Olivier Blanchard, has 
come into use recently in order to overcome certain ambiguities (see Cardoso and Portugal 2005, 
Bastos, Monteiro and Straume 2009). The older literature often uses the expressions “wage drift” 
(see, e.g., Gould 1967, Ordine 1996) or “wage gap” (see Gerfin 1969), both of which are 
somehow confusing. “Wage drift” is clearly a dynamic concept and should correctly refer only to 
the difference between the changes of actual and contractual wages, and “wage gap” has also 
been used to describe completely different concepts (such as gender wage gap or real wage 
gap). Other expressions used in the past are “wage glide”, “wage slide” and “wage spread” (see 
Külp 1965: 201). 
2   While in principle these indices can be used to calculate wage drift (i.e. the difference in the rates 
of change of actual and contractual wages), serious methodological problems suggest to be very 
cautious in interpreting such wage drift results (see Schnabel 1997: 134ff.). 4 
 
 
2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE 
In Germany, the constitutionally protected principle of bargaining autonomy gives 
organizations of employers and employees the right to regulate wages and working 
conditions without state interference. Collective agreements are legally binding and 
may be concluded either as multi-employer agreements at sectoral  level or as 
single-employer agreements at firm level. In addition, firms have the right not to 
conclude collective agreements, in which case they make use of individual 
contracts with their employees. Collective bargaining is mainly conducted at the 
sectoral level in regional bargaining units, but in certain sectors it is quite frequent 
at national or firm  level. The regional negotiations within one sector are closely 
coordinated by the officials of the appropriate sectoral trade union and employers 
association, so that variations between them are small (except for differences 
between western and eastern Germany which still exist in many sectors). Collective 
agreements determine blue and white collar pay (usually annually) as well as job 
classifications, working time and working conditions (over longer time periods). 
Collectively agreed norms are minimum standards, which means that firms bound 
by (sectoral- or firm-level) collective agreements cannot undercut, but only improve 
upon these terms and conditions. For instance, they may offer longer holidays or 
they pay higher wages than stipulated in the collective agreements, which leads to 
a wage cushion. 
While the Federal Statistical Office does not provide statistics on bargaining 
coverage and the wage cushion, this information can be obtained  from the 
representative IAB Establishment Panel (for a detailed description of this data set, 
see Fischer et al. 2009). The IAB Establishment Panel is drawn from a stratified 
sample of the plants included in the German  employment statistics, where the 
strata are defined over industries and plant sizes (large plants are oversampled), 
but the sampling within each cell is random. The panel started in 1993 (1996) in 
western (eastern) Germany, and over time  the number of establishments 
interviewed increased to almost 16,000, in order to allow regional analysis at the 
federal state level. Since the IAB Establishment Panel has been set up for the 
needs of the Federal Employment Agency, detailed information on the composition 
of the workforce and its development through time constitutes a major part of the 
questionnaire. Further questions include information on wages, profitability, 
establishment policies, and general information about the plant. Most important for 
our analysis, plants are also asked whether they are covered by collective 
agreements and whether they pay wages above the level stipulated in these 




Table 1: Bargaining coverage and presence of a wage cushion in the private 
 sector, 2006 
  western 
Germany 
eastern 
Germany  Germany 
number of plants surveyed  8,002  4,618  12,620 
share of plants covered by a collective 
agreement (in percent)  36.2  20.6  33.2 
- percentage of which pay wages as 
stipulated in the collective agreement        53.6        80.3        56.7 
- percentage of which pay wages above 
the level stipulated in the collective 
agreement 
      46.4        19.7        43.3 
wage cushion 
(amount by which actual wages lie 
above contractual wages, in percent) 
     
- in plants paying wages above the level 
stipulated in the collective agreement  10.4  10.7  10.4 
- in all plants covered by a collective 
agreement    4.7    2.0    4.4 
Notes: Weighted data, private sector only 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, wave 2006 
Table 1 presents information on bargaining coverage and the presence of a wage 
cushion in the private sector (the public sector is excluded since public employers 
regard the contractual wages negotiated nationally as binding actual wages). It can 
be seen that in 2006 about  one-third of plants (more precisely, 36 percent in 




 The majority of these plants did not deviate 
from the contractual wages stipulated in these agreements, which makes clear that 
collective bargaining between trade unions and employers associations is still very 
important in determining actual wages in Germany. That said, 46 percent of plants 
in western Germany and about 20 percent of plants in eastern Germany did pay 
wages above the level stipulated in the collective agreement. In these plants, the 
wage cushion (calculated as the amount by which actual wages exceeded 
contractual wages) was about 10 percent on average in western and eastern 
Germany. This implies that in the group of all plants covered by a collective 
agreement (including those not paying above the contractual wage) actual wages 
exceeded contractual wages by about 5 percent in western Germany and 2 percent 
in eastern Germany. 
                                            
3   Since larger plants are more likely to be covered by collective agreements, bargaining coverage 
of employees is much higher. For the private plus public sector, Ellguth and Kohaut (2007) report 
that in 2006 about 65 (54) percent of employees in western (eastern) Germany were covered by 
collective agreements. Analyses of the determinants of collective bargaining structure are 
provided by Hübler and Jirjahn (2003) and by Schnabel, Zagelmeyer and Kohaut (2006). 6 
 
 
Table 2: Presence and size of the wage cushion according to plant size, 2006 
 
share of plants covered by a 
collective agreement that pay 
wages above the level 
stipulated in the collective 
agreement (in percent) 
wage cushion 
(amount by which 
actual wages lie above 
contractual wages, in 
percent) 
number of employees 









1 to 9  41.4  16.5  10.7  11.4 
10 to 49  54.3  21.0  10.1  10.7 
50 to199  59.0  38.8    9.6    8.4 
200 to 499  62.7  31.1  10.3  10.5 
500 and more  65.7  19.5  11.4    9.9 
total  46.4  19.7  10.4  10.7 
Notes: Weighted data, private sector only 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, wave 2006 
Table 2 indicates that in small plants with less than ten employees actual wages do 
not exceed contractual wages very often. In western Germany, the incidence of a 
wage cushion rises with plant size, whereas in eastern Germany this relationship 
looks hump-shaped. In both regions, the size of the wage cushion does not seem to 
vary systematically with plant size.
4
In the rather sparse literature on the wage cushion, basically four theoretical 
approaches can be distinguished.
 Of course, it needs a multivariate analysis to 
clearly identify the relationship between plant size and the wage cushion. 
 
3.  THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS 
5
                                            
4   The incidence and the size of the wage cushion also vary between sectors. They are relatively 
high in the investment goods producing sector (particularly in western Germany) and quite low in 
construction. 
5   For more detailed discussions, see Külp (1965), Meyer (1994) and Schnabel (1997: ch. 6). Note 
that these explanations are not mutually exclusive. Muysken and van Veen (1996), for instance, 
present a model combining efficiency wage and bargaining explanations of the wage cushion. 
 The institutional approach interprets the wage 
cushion as a mechanism to overcome the constraints imposed by multi-employer 
collective bargaining, allowing firms some room for manoeuvre in wage-setting (see 
Cardoso and Portugal 2005). Since  in most cases bargaining in Germany is 
relatively centralized, collective agreements cannot take into account the specific 
situation of individual plants. They may also reflect egalitarian policies of trade 
unions. Furthermore, collective agreements contain a limited number of wage 
brackets for job classifications mainly based on formal qualification and tasks, 
which serve as a sort of minimum wages for employees who fall in the respective 
classifications. Firms which need to differentiate further or want to overcome the 7 
 
 
wage compression resulting from an egalitarian union wage policy can only do so 
by paying wages above the minimum stipulated in multi-employer agreements (or 
by switching to single-employer or no collective bargaining). 
A traditional explanation of the wage cushion, which already can be found in 
Hansen and Rehn (1956), stresses the role of market forces and may thus be 
termed the market approach. Based on the neoclassical theory of labour supply and 
demand, the wage cushion (and wage drift) is simply interpreted as the result of 
excess demand for labour. If there is a shortage of labour in a certain segment of 
the labour market or in the aggregate labour market, actual wages go up (whereas 
contractual wages may not react so quickly). This will be particularly the case in 
times of full employment (see also Külp 1965: 238). In this approach, outside 
factors such as aggregate or regional unemployment should be the most important 
determinants of the wage cushion whereas factors inside the plant (for instance 
profitability) should not be relevant. 
Market forces such as the labour market situation also play a role in bargaining 
theories of the wage cushion insofar as they affect the aims and opportunities of 
employees and employers at the plant level. In addition, all other factors that 
influence the bargaining position and the utility and profits of both sides are taken 
into account. Bargaining models usually take the contractual wage determined at 
the sectoral level as given and interpret wage setting at the firm level as a result of 
firm-specific bargaining between employers and trade unions (see, e.g., Holden 
1990). Actual wages will be higher than stipulated in sectoral agreements if the 
economic situation and the ability to pay of the plant are better than assumed in 
sectoral bargaining and/or if the bargaining position of employees at plant level is 
better than at sectoral level. In Germany, the interests of employees at plant level 
are usually represented by works councils, which by law are excluded from 
reaching agreement with the employer on wages (unless sectoral agreements 
explicitly authorize such agreements). However, their extensive rights of 
information, consultation and co-determination on many other issues mean that 
works councils have considerable bargaining power which can be used for rent-
seeking and pushing through higher actual  wages (see  Addison, Schnabel and 
Wagner 2001, Hübler and Jirjahn 2003).
6
While the previous two explanations assume that firms are forced to pay higher 
wages by the market or by the bargaining power of their employees, the efficiency 
wage  approach (see, e.g., Weiss 1991) suggests that the wage cushion is an 
 
                                            
6   Instead of resulting from explicit bargaining, the wage cushion could also be modeled as the 
result of anticipated or implied negotiations where the employer anticipates the results of an indi-
vidual negotiation with her employee in order to save transaction costs (see Pull 1996). In this case, 
a wage cushion can even exist in the absence of trade unions or works councils at plant level. 8 
 
 
instrument of personnel policy voluntarily applied by firms in order to stimulate 
labour productivity. Assuming incomplete information about the motivation, effort 
and capability of their employees, firms may be willing to pay higher wages than 
stipulated in collective contracts in order to attract better qualified employees, avoid 
costly quits, reduce shirking and better motivate their workforce. The efficiency 
wage and thus the size of the wage cushion is the result of profit-maximizing 
behaviour of firms and reflects the determinants of employee effort such as the 
labour market situation, the level of alternative wages or the profitability of the firm 
(for instance via fairness considerations). 
The fact that some potential determinants such as the labour market situation play 
a role in various explanations of the wage cushion discussed above and that these 
approaches are not mutually exclusive indicates that it will be very difficult to clearly 
distinguish empirically between alternative theoretical explanations. A significant 
influence of the labour market situation (measured by unemployment rates, 
vacancies or other indicators) was found in most previous analyses of the wage 
cushion in western Germany (see Meyer 1994, Bellmann and Kohaut 1995, Kohaut 
and Schnabel 2003).
7
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
  While Kohaut and Schnabel (2003) also obtained some 
evidence for the institutional approach, the finding by Meyer (1994) and Addison, 
Schnabel and Wagner (2001) that the wage cushion is significantly higher in plants 
where managers regard higher wages as an instrument for increasing employee 
motivation clearly points to the relevance of efficiency wage theory. Despite the 
problem of observational equivalence, theory may serve as a useful guide in 
selecting explanatory variables in the following empirical analysis of the wage 
cushion. 
 
In contrast to Ordine (1996), Cardoso and Portugal (2005) and Bastos, Monteiro 
and Straume (2009), who analyze both the contractual wage and the wage cushion, 
lack of data on contractual wages in the plants that are our units of observation 
means that we are only able to investigate the presence and the size of a wage 
cushion in Germany.
8
                                            
7   A number of studies have also analyzed wage drift in western Germany; see, e.g., Gerfin (1969), 
Gahlen and Ramser (1987) and Schnabel (1997). International analyses of wage drift can be 
found, inter alia, in Holden (1990), Lupi and Ordine (1993), Pehkonen and Viscari (1994) and 
Hibbs and Locking (1996). 
 The IAB Establishment Panel data used include information 
8   The determinants of aggregate contractual wage changes are analyzed by Schnabel (1997) and 
Heilemann and Ulrich (2007). Due to lack of data on the contractual wages of individuals or 
plants, most studies for Germany analyze the level (or change) of actual wages. A typical finding 
is that actual wages are higher in plants covered by collective agreements, although this may 
partly reflect a non-random selection of firms and employees into collective bargaining regimes 9 
 
 
on a number of potential plant-level covariates and are supplemented by data on 
the regional unemployment rate at the level of districts. The explanatory variables 
employed are listed in Table 3 (summary statistics are reported in an appendix 
table). Their signs reflect their expected relationship with the wage cushion as 
stipulated in the various theoretical approaches sketched above (which of course 
can only be crudely represented in such a table). It can be seen that most variables 
are consistent with more than one theoretical approach, so that there will be few 
clear-cut hypotheses which can be used to empirically test the relevance of these 
theories. 
Table 3: Expected relationship with the wage cushion of variables used in 











regional unemployment rate  
(at district level, in percent) 
 
vacancy rate  
(in percent of employment) 
 
vacancies for qualified jobs  
(share of all vacancies, in percent) 
 
share of qualified employees 
(in percent) 
 
share of part-time employees 
(in percent) 
 
share of female employees 
(in percent) 
 
profit situation  
(dummy: very good/good=1) 
 
modern production technology 









(number of employees) 
 
difficulties in hiring skilled workers 
expected (dummy: 1=yes) 
 
insufficient employee motivation 

























































































































































Note: The empirical estimations will also include two controls that cannot be related clearly to the 
theoretical approaches above, namely industry dummies and a dummy for branch plant status. 
                                                                                                                                      
(see, e.g., Stephan and Gerlach 2005, Gürtzgen 2006). However, in these studies it cannot be 
distinguished whether higher actual wages are due to higher contractual wages or to a higher 
wage cushion at the plant level. 10 
 
 
A central determinant of the wage cushion in three of the four theoretical 
explanations discussed above is the labour market situation. We are able to include 
the regional unemployment rate (at the district level) as well as the plant’s vacancy 
rate and its share of vacancies for qualified jobs as explanatory variables. The 
higher the unemployment rate and the lower the two vacancy rates, the lower 
should be the wage cushion. In order to reduce problems of reverse causality, 
these three explanatory variables will be lagged by one year. 
We also take account of the structure of the workforce by including the employment 
shares of qualified (i.e. medium-skilled and skilled) workers, part-time workers and 
women as explanatory variables. Previous analyses with disaggregated data (cf. 
Schnabel 1997: 159 ff.) suggest that qualified employees are more often and to a 
larger extent paid above the contractual wage, since quits of this group would be 
relatively costly. In contrast, the lower labour force attachment and tenure of women 
and part-time workers (resulting in lower firm-specific human capital) suggest that 
these groups will rarely be paid wages above the contractual level. This reasoning 
is consistent both with efficiency wage and bargaining explanations of the wage 
cushion, but these variables should not play a role according to the market 
approach. 
In contrast to the institutional and the market approach, both bargaining theory and 
the fair-wage variant of efficiency wage theory suggest that the existence and size 
of the wage cushion depend positively on the  plant’s profitability. We therefore 
include a dummy variable indicating whether managers regarded the profit situation 
in the previous year as very good or good. A similar dummy variable reflects a 
modern production technology in the plant, which is expected to correlate positively 
with the wage cushion. State-of-the-art technology may indicate the presence of 
quasi-rents and favour rent-sharing, but it could also mean that plants have to 
attract and motivate high-skilled employees by paying wage premiums. 
While the previous explanatory variables are each consistent with more than one 
theoretical explanation, there are some covariates that only play a role in a single 
approach and thus can be used to crudely discriminate between theories. For 
instance, we are able to include a dummy variable reflecting the existence or not of 
a works council in the plant (lagged by one year to avoid endogeneity problems that 
could result if employees chose to erect a works council in order to obtain a higher 
wage cushion). According to bargaining theory, the existence of a works council 
with substantial bargaining power in many areas should result in a higher wage 
cushion. 
The institutional approach sketched above relates the presence of a wage cushion 
to the fact that collective agreements at sectoral level cannot take into account the 11 
 
 
specific situation of individual plants. This hypothesis can be tested by including a 
dummy variable for the existence of a firm-level (rather than a sectoral-level) 
collective agreement. Since such an agreement actually can take into account the 
firm-specific situation, the wage cushion should be considerably lower or even non-
existent in plants with such firm-level agreements. The regression coefficient of this 
dummy variable is therefore expected to be negative. 
According to efficiency wage theory, the size of a plant should be positively 
correlated with the wage cushion. The larger plants are, the more complex are 
organizational structures and the more difficult is it for management to supervise 
and monitor employees, so that it may make sense to pay wage premiums as 
incentives. In order to allow for a non-linear relationship, plant size is included in 
linear and quadratic form in the estimations. 
In the 2006 wave of the IAB Establishment Panel, managers were also asked which 
problems of personnel policy they expected in the next two years. We may thus 
include a dummy variable reflecting difficulties in hiring skilled employees, which 
should play a role for the wage cushion according to the market approach, the 
bargaining approach and the adverse selection variant of efficiency wage theory. 
Another dummy variable takes on the value of one if managers expected an 
insufficient motivation of their employees, which according to efficiency wage theory 
could be overcome by a wage premium and thus should result in a (higher) wage 
cushion. However, since these two dummy variables refer to expected future 
problems and could be endogenous, they should be interpreted cautiously.
9
                                            
9   Note that while the wage cushion would be higher if managers expect and try to avoid difficulties 
in hiring skilled workers and insufficient employee motivation, a reverse causality (i.e. that an 
insufficient  wage cushion creates hiring and motivation problems) would result in a negative 
relationship between these two dummy variables and the wage cushion. 
 In our 
estimations we will therefore present two models, one excluding these variables 
(model 1) and one including them (model 2). 
Finally, we add two control variables that cannot be related clearly to the theoretical 
explanations in Chapter 3. A branch plant/subsidiary dummy variable catches the 
possibility that due to spill-over effects from their (large) mother company 
establishments in multi-plant organizations might be more likely to have wage 
cushions than independent plants. We also control for sector affiliation by including 




Table 4: Determinants of the wage cushion, 2006 
(only private sector plants covered by a collective agreement; tobit  
estimations; dependent variable is size of the wage cushion in percent) 
explanatory variables 









regional unemployment rate ‡ 
(at district level, in percent) 
 
vacancy rate ‡ 
(in percent of employment) 
 
vacancies for qualified jobs ‡ 
(share of all vacancies, in percent) 
 
share of qualified employees 
(in percent) 
 
share of part-time employees 
(in percent) 
 
share of female employees 
(in percent) 
 
profit situation ‡ 
(dummy: very good/good=1) 
 
modern production technology 
(dummy:1 or 2 on 5-point scale=1) 
 
works council ‡ 
(dummy: 1=yes) 
 




(number of employees) 
 






difficulties in hiring skilled workers 
expected (dummy: 1=yes) 
 
insufficient employee motivation 










































































































































































































Notes: Robust t-values (based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the district  level)  in 
brackets.  */**/*** denote statistical significance at the 10/5/1 percent level. ‡  indicates that the 
information refers to the previous year. 




The results of our empirical investigations using data from the IAB Establishment 
Panel for the year 2006 are reported in Tables 4 and 5. Due to the different labour 
market situation and the vast differences in bargaining coverage and the presence 
of a wage cushion visible in Table 1, we present separate estimations for western 
and eastern Germany. In Table 4, the dependent variable is the size of the wage 
cushion in percent. Since this cannot become negative and since a large share of 
plants covered by collective agreements does not pay higher actual than 
contractual wages (see Table 1), so that the wage cushion is often zero, we use the 
tobit estimation procedure (for details on this method, see Greene 2000: ch. 20). 
The results for models 1 and 2 presented in Table 4 show that not all covariates 
play a significant role in explaining the wage cushion. It can be seen that in both 
parts of Germany the wage cushion is positively related to the profitability and the 
state of production technology of the plant. It is lower in plants covered by firm-level 
agreements and higher if managers expect difficulties in hiring skilled workers. The 
share of vacancies for qualified jobs (but not the overall vacancy rate) also plays a 
role, whereas the external labour market situation is significantly related to the 
wage cushion in eastern Germany but does not reach conventional levels of 
significance in western Germany. In contrast, the employment share of part-timers, 
plant size and managers’ expectations concerning insufficient employee motivation 
are only significant in western Germany. 
While the tobit estimation procedure used in Table 4 combines information on the 
presence and the size of the wage cushion, Table 5 presents separate estimations 
(of model 1 only) for the presence of the wage cushion (using the probit method) 
and of the size of the wage cushion in those plants paying wages above the 
contractual level (using a truncated regression model). It can be seen that our 
model is mainly able to explain the presence of a wage cushion whereas the 
truncated regression model on the size of this cushion proves to be insignificant. 
Interestingly, however, even at the 10 percent level of significance a likelihood ratio 
test (as suggested by Greene 2000: 915) does not reject the more restrictive tobit 




Table 5: Determinants of the presence and size of a wage cushion, 2006  
(only private sector plants covered by a collective agreement; dependent 
variables are a dummy for the presence and the size of the wage cushion 
in percent, respectively) 
explanatory variables 









regional unemployment rate ‡ 
(at district level, in percent) 
 
vacancy rate ‡ 
(in percent of employment) 
 
vacancies for qualified jobs ‡ 
(share of all vacancies, in percent) 
 
share of qualified employees 
(in percent) 
 
share of part-time employees 
(in percent) 
 
share of female employees 
(in percent) 
 
profit situation ‡ 
(dummy: very good/good=1) 
 
modern production technology 
(dummy:1 or 2 on 5-point scale=1) 
 
works council ‡ 
(dummy: 1=yes) 
 




(number of employees) 
 





















































































































































































Notes: Robust z-values (based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the district level)  in 
brackets.  */**/*** denote statistical significance at the 10/5/1 percent level. ‡  indicates that the 
information refers to the previous year. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, wave 2006; own estimations. 15 
 
 
Interpreting the results in Tables 4 and 5 in terms of the four theoretical approaches 
sketched in chapter 3, there is at least partial support for each of these 
explanations. The institutional hypothesis is confirmed since plants which make use 
of firm-level collective agreements that enable them to take firm-specific conditions 
explicitly into consideration are significantly less likely to have wage cushions. The 
statistical significance of various indicators of labour shortage and of the regional 
unemployment rate is in accordance with the market forces approach, but of course 
it is also consistent with other theories. However, the fact that the profit situation of 
the plant also plays a significant role is inconsistent with a pure institutional or 
market explanation of the wage cushion. While most of the covariates suggested by 
bargaining theories (such as profitability and  labour shortages) are found to be 
significant, the statistical insignificance of the crucial works council variable casts 
some doubt on the bargaining explanation. Finally, most of the explanatory 
variables derived from efficiency wage theory prove to be significant, but only in 
western Germany there is weak statistical evidence for the relevance of plant size – 
the only variable that solely plays a role in this approach. Taken together, these 
results suggest that the wage cushion cannot be explained by one theoretical 
approach only. 
In order to exploit the panel character of our data and to provide a sort of 
robustness check of our results from the cross-sectional analyses in Tables 4 and 
5, we also perform fixed effects estimation for the period 2001-2006 (although this 
reduces the sample size by about 80 percent). Since fixed effects tobit estimation is 
not feasible, since information on the size of the wage cushion is not available in 
every year and since Table 5 has shown that the explanatory power of our model is 
largely restricted to presence of a wage cushion, we make use of fixed effect logit 
analyses of the presence or not of a wage cushion. The results of these panel 
estimations for western and eastern Germany are presented in Table 6 for two 
alternative specifications with and without year dummies.
10
                                            
10  The observation period 2000-2006 results from the fact that from the wave 2000 on the number 
of plants surveyed by the IAB Establishment Panel has increased substantially, and we need to 
take lagged variables from this wave. We first obtained pooled logit estimates for 2001-2006, 
which were largely consistent with the cross-sectional estimates of wage cushion presence for 
2006 shown in Table 5 (except that the works council variable now had a significant coefficient in 
western Germany). We then performed a Hausman test (see Greene 2000: 841) which preferred 
the fixed effects logit model presented in Table 6 rather than the pooled logit model (the results of 





Table 6: Determinants of the presence of a wage cushion, 2001-2006 
(only private sector plants covered by a collective agreement; fixed effects 
logit estimates; dependent variable is a dummy for the presence of a wage 
cushion) 
explanatory variables  western Germany  eastern Germany 
regional unemployment rate ‡ 
(at district level, in percent) 
 
vacancy rate ‡ 
(in percent of employment) 
 
vacancies for qualified jobs ‡ 
(share of all vacancies, in percent) 
 
share of qualified employees 
(in percent) 
 
share of part-time employees 
(in percent) 
 
share of female employees 
(in percent) 
 
profit situation ‡ 
(Dummy: very good/good=1) 
 
modern production technology 
(dummy:1 or 2 on 5-scale index=1) 
 
works council ‡ 
(Dummy: 1=yes) 
 




(number of employees) 
 







































































































































































number of observations N 
number of plants n 


















Notes: Robust z-values (based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the district level)  in 
brackets.  */**/*** denote statistical significance at the 10/5/1 percent level. ‡  indicates that the 
information refers to the previous year. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 2000-2006; own estimations. 17 
 
 
A striking result of these fixed effects estimations is that only few explanatory 
variables retain their statistical significance (which may be due to the fact that some 
variables do not vary much over time). In western Germany, a wage cushion is 
more likely to exist if the profit situation of the plant is very good or good, and it is 
less likely if the plant is covered by a firm-level agreement. While the former result 
is consistent with bargaining or efficiency wage explanations, the latter confirms the 
relevance of the institutional approach. The regional unemployment rate also 
proves to be significant in the specification without year dummies but becomes 
insignificant when (highly significant) year dummies are added (see the second and 
third column of Table 6, respectively). This implies that it is the cyclical rather than 
the regional component of the unemployment rate that plays a role – the wage 
cushion seems to vary more with the business cycle than with regional labour 
market conditions. In eastern Germany, almost all covariates are insignificant 
individually, whereas the model as a whole is significant. Notable exceptions are 
the profit situation of a plant and the year dummies, which again underscores the 
relevance of the wage cushion in adjusting wages to changing economic conditions. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Using a large and representative establishment data set, this paper has shown that 
in 2006 among plants covered by collective agreements about 46 (20) percent of 
plants in western (eastern) Germany paid wages above the level stipulated in the 
relevant collective agreement, giving rise to a wage cushion between the levels of 
actual and contractual wages. Cross-sectional estimations and fixed-effects 
estimations for the period 2000-2006 indicate that the (presence of a) wage cushion 
mainly varies with the profit situation of the plant and with indicators of labour 
shortage and the business cycle. Moreover, plants which make use of firm-level 
rather than sectoral-level collective agreements that enable them to take firm-
specific conditions explicitly into consideration are significantly less likely to have 
wage cushions. While our results are (at least partially) consistent with various 
theoretical explanations, it is interesting to see that outside factors (such as the 
regional unemployment rate and the business cycle) as well as inside factors (such 
as establishment profitability) play a role in setting actual wages at the plant level 
(conditional on given contractual wages). 
Coming back to the question in the title of our paper, our empirical analyses 
indicate that plants with a wage cushion do not pay more than necessary. Quite in 
contrast, for plants bound by multi-employer agreements it seems necessary to pay 
wage premiums in order to overcome the restrictions imposed by the rather 18 
 
 
centralized system of collective bargaining in Germany.
11
                                            
11  Of course it may be asked why firms make use of multi-employer bargaining at all if it poses 
some constraints on them. Potential answers include saving on transaction cost, profiting from 
wage moderation in centralized bargaining, avoiding industrial conflicts at plant level, and the 
cumbersome procedure of abandoning collective bargaining. For an empirical investigation of 
firms’ choice of multi-employer, single-employer or no collective bargaining in Germany, see 
Schnabel, Zagelmeyer and Kohaut (2006). 
 This result is consistent 
with findings for Portugal by Cardoso and Portugal (2005). The responsiveness of 
the wage cushion to the business cycle also suggests that it gives plants some 
room for manoeuvre in adjusting actual wages more quickly to changing economic 
conditions than is possible in the (annual) bargaining rounds which determine 
contractual wages. Furthermore, the finding that plants with a good profit situation 
are more likely to pay wages above the contractual minimum might be interpreted 
as an indication that fairness considerations make it necessary to pay such 
efficiency wages in order to sustain employee motivation and effort (although it is 
also consistent with a rent-sharing and thus bargaining explanation). 
Against this background it is interesting to see that both bargaining coverage and 
the incidence of the wage cushion in Germany have declined in recent years. While 
in 2000 about 42 percent of private sector establishments were bound by a 
collective agreement, 48 percent of which paid higher actual than contractual 
wages, in 2006 this was only the case for 33 and 43 percent of establishments, 
respectively. This has at least two implications: On the one hand, since fewer firms 
make use of it, collective bargaining seems to have become less dominant in the 
private sector. On the other hand, for the firms which still adhere to collective 
bargaining, centralized wage setting seems to have become even more dominant 
since fewer of these firms deviate from the contractual wages negotiated there by 
paying higher actual wages. Whether the flexibility of the entire system of wage 
setting is enhanced by these developments is an open question beyond the scope 
of this paper. The severe economic crisis of 2008/09 and the reactions of firms in 
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Appendix Table: Summary statistics of the sample used in Tables 4 and 5 (2006) 
variables  western Germany  eastern Germany 
mean  std. dev.  mean  std. dev. 
presence of a wage cushion 
(dummy: actual wages above 
contractual wages=1) 
 
size of the wage cushion 
(in percent) 
 
regional unemployment rate 
(at district level, in percent) 
 
vacancy rate 
(in percent of employment) 
 
vacancies for qualified jobs 
(share of all vacancies, in percent) 
 
share of qualified employees 
(in percent) 
 
share of part-time employees 
(in percent) 
 




(dummy: very good/good=1) 
 
modern production technology 














difficulties in hiring skilled workers 
expected (dummy: 1=yes) 
 
insufficient employee motivation 





























































































































































































Notes: Unweighted data, only plants in the private sector covered by a collective agreement 
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